[The State Department and the War Department and the Navy all agreed War was coming.]
Not really the Navy's intention with having the fleet at Pearl was to have them to respond to the Japan, whom they assumed in 41 would attack the Phillipines, the USN assumed because they had the intercepts that war was coming an attack was going to be launched at the Phillipines [and really hindsight being what it was, in ten years the State Department would be able to independently of the DoD being able to confirm that major surface combatants, i.e. the Japanese Carrier Force were not in home waters] because the working assumption was that the Carrier group was in home waters (it wasn't they had already sailed).
You're talking about Richardson right? The CinC in 1940, because he publicly argued with the POTUS over the redeployment of the fleet to Pearl because he disagreed with the notion of Forward Defense which was the accepted naval policy at the time (again by 1940 the USN had turned into an echo chamber) and everyone knew Richardson was going to get sacked if he kept at it. (Now, after Pearl happens everyone who objected to forward basing comes out of the woodwork but in 1940 that was the accepted line out of the navy, and when King comes in, he makes it clear that the USN is prioritizing the battle of the atlantic (which is a whole other clusterfuck) basically Richardson was fired for political reasons he got mouthy with FDR, FDR didn't like his CINC doing that now after Pearl (King would get away with the same thing, but King both had pearl behind them, and had a reputation for being a belligerent asshole, but also it bears in mind FDR and King were friends so King got away with a lot more shit than Richardson ever did after becoming the US Naval Chief).
My point was more within US chain of command Richardson was already on the outs, and his going over Stark's head to complain to Roosevelt is the kind of thing that in the US system is ussually a bridge too far. Why did the republicans not bring it up? Hell if I know, at the time Pearl was probably too fresh the attack probably put everyone in the camp of we may not like Roosevelt but we're going to go kill the foreign problem first... [And an example of this in the more modern period, post 9-11 Feinstein and Clinton in FP terms are basically Bush the Younger's friends, Feinstein in the senate basically gives Bush everything he asks for, her policy on drone strikes was YES! Drone strike all the things. in this case its we're all together right now to go make sure that guy (the hostile foreign power) has a really bad day, we'll go back to arguing after they've been set on fire.]
On destroyermen? For sure Like I like the book series, but in fictional terms, I can't just write two dimensional mustache twirling villians (because if that were the case, and they don't have magic they probably should have devolved into open civilian long before the americans show up) same with the East india company, that would have to be something that changes.
I think,that something like real noble cabals ruling their society with iron fist ,but without needled cruelty.Sometching like real Venetia,maybe.Elites there ruled with little bloodsheed for at least 600 years,keeping good Navy and Army for more times.
Yeah, there was no intention to send those people to fight, but your postal, train, prison guards rear echelon supply guys all still needed guns they didn't have to be good guns but they still needed them.
It is the licensed production pre war 98, actual date of license would probably be 1909 by Mauser though they have a renewed liscence through FN from 1915 because FN was selling licenses like hotcakes after they got to England (Belgium being occupied and all that and FN needed money).
So the Argentina Mauser?
Argentina's mauser is in 7.65 this is in 7.92 (what is colloquially called 8mm Mauser). If anything it would probably be closest to the Thai pattern Mauser 98 rifles or the Chinese 1910 Rifle (which here the rest of that order was bought before the war started so they're actually in China rather than sitting obendorf.)
Argentina's mauser is in 7.65 this is in 7.92 (what is colloquially called 8mm Mauser). If anything it would probably be closest to the Thai pattern Mauser 98 rifles or the Chinese 1910 Rifle (which here the rest of that order was bought before the war started so they're actually in China rather than sitting obendorf.)
I need to find a picture of a commercial 1907 7.92 rifle that would be the closest to what the guns would like
EDIT: HOpefully this picture shows:(Its a little rough condition obviously but general features wise, no stock disk, no langesvissier)
EDIT2: That being said, I will be using Mauser as a shorthand or Gewehr to refer to rifles in general including the Hanyang / comission 88 which is the most common pattern rifle period in China never mind that it is also in 7.92 / 8mm Mauser cartridge.
Besides being both historically accurate for shorthand (much like how ever revolver is a colt, or every semi automatic pistol (that isn't a luger or a Mauser) typically gets called a Browning) it refers to both the action and the Cartridge. This will continue even after Xian moves to a universal short rifle in the 20s and when Xian introduces specialist 8mm Self Loading Rifles as an intermediary. Mauser will largely drop off post World War II when Xian moves to universal service assault rifles which is self loading and intermediary though Mausers will remain in a sniper role for some time after that, and in a machine gun role until superseded by the FN MAG in the early cold war
I mean I don't think you'd be able to produce enough of them realistically if the design is finished in '34 just spinning up the machine tooling for the rifle is going to take 18 months probably, if not longer. Going from batch production to mass production takes ~ three years.
True I completely agree and England is not blameless, the reason the academic consensus is typically France is that France was the state after ww1 that kept trying to talk about a security framework (Britain does to but in different context, and in the context of the empire, Britain is not going to spend money on the army, the RN has its budget determined by this is what the treaties say (it doesn't matter that the USN is never going to get that money from Congress, the treaty is what Britain sets how much it will build from) and the RAF gets the rest of the budget pretty much) but France really from 1917 keeps talking about 'we need this security compact, but refuses to spend money on, the French cut conscription requirements, there are purges of the army officer corp, the Navy is a complete clusterfuck (which its the French Navy thats a habitual problem rather than an interwar exclusive problem), there is the fallout of the Franco-Belgian occupation, there is France's repeated attempts to get out of getting out of loans (there is a french default on war loans that France could have paid back but chose not to due to the gold standard) which both of those negatively impact Franco British American relations during the interwar period, it is one of the contributing factors to cash and carry being a thing, but it is also a case of there a combination of Factors that make the French out to be parasitical to the allied war effort as a political entity.
Percival had either lost his nerve at some point before he was appointed, which I will accept as an explanation because his papers prior to his appointment showed he was increasingly erratic on the subject regarding singapore and thus the fault for the fall of Singapore is on Imperial General Headquarters of the British Empire, or he fell out and out to cowardice in December of 41, in which case he should have been court martialed. I do not accept Churchhill's claim that Malaya and Singapore fell in 'the worst defeat in British history' because material had been sent to the middle east and to Russia, that smacks of an excuse for lack of a proper fight, now I will accept that the Japanese army would have eventually taken singapore and malaya but I would hope if a proper defense were mounted the British would have had the good sense to blow the fuel depots in the far east to deny them to the Japanese, and those bunkers falling to the Japanese intact is to me the most damning part of the fall of Singapore and Malaya in a strategic concert of the broader war.